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The Jahmiyya was a heretical theological movement in the early Islamic period. The two central figures in the theology were Jahm b. Safwan, an Arab Khorasani, and Dirar b. ‘Amr, a Kufan, who were inspired by heterodox Christian doctrine.

Jahm b. Safwan (d. 745-6)
Jahm b. Safwan created a natural theology opposed to the standard readings of Islam, heavily indebted to Christian and Pre-Christian Greek Philosophy. For this, he and his ideas were criticised by many different creedal sects in the early period, including the Mu’tazilis, Ash’aris, and especially the Hanbalis. Criticism of his ideas can be found in Ibn Hanbal’s al-Radd ‘ala al-Zanadiqa wa’l-Jahmiyya, Al-Ash’ari’s Maqalat al-Islamiyyin, Al-Malati’s Tanbih, and Al-Darimi’s ar-Radd ‘ala l-Gahmiya.

Richard Frank writing in 1965 discussed Jahm’s thought in a neoplatonic context with parallels to Plotinus’ Enneades, especially when Jahm makes a distinction between God and things (ashya). Likewise, Harry Wolfson suggests a Christian, Trinitarian origin for the Jahmiyya doctrine, along with influence from Philo, Albinus, Plotinus and the Church Fathers. On the other hand, Cornelia Schöck (whose chapter in the Oxford Handbook is the basis of this summary) disputes this and suggests a grounding in Aristotelian theory of knowledge and an origin in Christian trinitarian debates against the Church Fathers, borrowing from the Arians arguing on a logical basis against the godhead of the Son in Christianity. So, for example, when Jahm says that the Qur’anic attributes of God do not indicate predication, it is similar to the doctrines espoused by Arius, Aetius and Eunomius of Cyzikus that it is impossible to predicate God, and anything said of God is a matter of his identity. This is a semantic issue. But, Jahm does not argue that attributes are not things but that God is not a thing, not that he does not exist but that he is distinct from things. By ruling out predications, he believes himself to have preserved God’s simplicity.

So what are the ontological distinctions made by Jahm?

The Scholar Al-Ash’ari reports that Jahm’s doctrine held that God’s knowledge is temporarily originated, or muhdath. This is because Jahm believed that God knows a thing either prior to their existence by a knowledge he brings into existence prior to the thing, or God knows a thing in the state of its origin (fii hali huduthihi). The argument of Jahm b. Safwan is that since what is not existent (ma laysa bi-mawjudin) is not a thing prior to its existence, knowledge or ignorance of it is impossible. This means that according to Jahm’s theology, God would not be knowing at one point, and then knowing, which is inconsistent with the logic of God not undergoing substantial or qualitative change. Jahm believed that God only knew of the existent corporeal, as if the knowledge of God were empirical and based on induction like his creation. This, obviously, was a point of contention for Muslim scholars.

Jahm and his adversaries believed that knowledge and ignorance need an object to which they refer to. But ofcourse, an omniscient God would know of ’things’ beyond the corporeal, immaterial things such as substances (jawahir), accidents (a’rad), activities (af’al) and classes (ajnas) such as colours, movements, tastes. A Mu’tazili scholar named ‘Abbad b. Sulayman (d.874) agreed that these were objects of God’s knowledge, despite being immaterial.

When the Qur’an mentions in 42:11 “Laysa ka-mithlihi shay’un” or that “Not thing is like something like him”, most other historical scholars such as Al-Tabari (Jami, xxv 12f) or Al-Razi (Tafsir, xxvii.129.25) understand that “no thing at all is like him” while Jahm rejects that the term “thing” refers to God in the first place. Instead, Jahm puts forward the interpretation that “laysa mithla mithlihi shay’un” or “no thing is alike to something like him”. A thing is that which can be the object of induction. Schöck says that these arguments are the same logical procedures on the basis of which Arians argued that ‘God’ could be understood as a common property of God the Father and God the Son in Christianity.

Alongside these, according to Ibn Hanbal, the Jaymiyyah believed God could not be described or known by any characteristic or action, nor does God have a boundary (ghaya), nor a limit (muntaha) and cannot be perceived by the intellect. He is fully knowledge, fully hearing, fully seeing, etc. The Jahmis do not believe these are predications of God, but rather identity statements. They also deny all the attributes (according to Al-Malati in Tanbih 96.2-5), and believe that those, and verbs applied to God, are identical in meaning, or in other words, with one meaning (bi-ma’na wahid) (according to Al-Darimi’s Radd 95.19-21). Schöck believes this theory reported of the Jahmis agrees with that of the neo-Arian Eunomius of Cyzikus, and not the Church Fathers.

Finally, Al-Ash’ari’s Maqalat 279.3-9 discusses tht Jahm believes that God is the only cause, or the only agent (fa’il) and no activity belongs to anything else but him. Activities of humans are only correlated in ‘ala l-majaz (tropical speech), such as when someone says “the tree moves”, or “the celestial body orbits”.

Jahm b. Safwan was also the first to introduce into the Islamic dialogue:

This is a short summary I have written of Patricia Schöck’s article on Jahm b. Safwan and Dirar b. ‘Amr in the Oxford Handbook of Islamic Theology in order to understand the points made better and refer to it later.